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The Confines of Modern Constitutionalism
DAVID T. BUTLERITCHIE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutionalism is an ambiguous concept, or at least the term is used
in ambiguous ways. Virtually every political theorist of the modern period, certainly during the last two hundred years or more, has used the concept of a political constitution in some way or another. There is very little
agreement, however, on what the term constitutionalism actually represents. Some mean it in a restrictive way, others in a more expansive way.
Some use it in a proscriptive manner, while others employ it prescriptively
(some, perhaps, even use it pejoratively). What nearly everyone who uses
the term shares, though, is the thought that modern societies need a constitution in order to be properly constructed.1 In fact, many maintain that the
development and implementation of a constitution is a prerequisite to a
nation-state being recognized as legitimate.2
In what follows, I explore the development of modern constitutionalism. Such an exploration is necessary in order to show two things. First,
that the contemporary notions surrounding the design, use, and efficacy of
a constitution rests on distinctly rationalist grounds.3 Second, such an examination will show that this rationalist foundation, with its attendant lib* Associate Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law. B.A., J.D., LL.M., Ph.D. This paper is
a portion of a larger project in which I am engaged. I would like to thank Cheyney Ryan, John Lysaker, Bonnie Mann, Jim O’Fallon and Steve Seiberson for their comments on the views presented
here. I would also like to express my gratitude to Kirsten ButleRitchie, Jackie Davis, Carey Kefauver,
James McGrath, Reginald Oh, and Michelle Justus Talbott for their thoughtful critiques of my work.
Finally, I would like to thank the Dean and Faculty at the Appalachian School of Law for their ongoing
support and encouragement.
1. Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory 42 (Manchester U. Press 1996); see Allen N.
Sultan, Principle and Practical Foundations of a Global Constitutional Order, 3 Wash. U. Global
Stud. L. Rev. 155, 162 (2004) (maintaining a view that this normative requirement should be viewed
from a global perspective).
2. Ziyad Motala, Constitutional Options for a Democratic South Africa: A Comparative Perspective chs. 1-2 (Howard U. Press 1994); Saïd Amir Arjomand, Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order, 33 Eur. J. Sociology 39, 73 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism,
14 Cardozo L. Rev. 907, 907 (1992).
3. See e.g. Thomas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in Constitutionalism:
Nomos XX 189–209 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y. U. Press 1979).
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eral political apparatus, has led many founders to view constitutionalism
(in application) as a very narrow formalist enterprise. I will not attempt a
fully formed history of constitutionalism and the concepts associated with
it. Such examinations have been undertaken before.4 I also do not develop
the notion of ancient constitutionalism, or the Romanized variants that led
to the development of modern constitutionalism, in any real depth.5 What I
will do, however, is trace the development of certain threads that have had
a tremendous influence on how constitutionalist concepts are employed
today. These threads form the fabric of modern constitutionalism. This
examination will show how the conflation and oversimplification of important social and political ideas actually undermine the constitutionalist enterprise. Ultimately, I maintain that the sort of narrow constitutionalism
that has gained conceptual hegemony constrains social formation because
it is beholden to concepts and interests that lie outside the incipient state
involved in the constitutional project.
Prominent in my analysis of how modern constitutionalism has developed are the concepts of “modernism” and “liberalism.” A note should be
made here about my use of these concepts. Any discussion that hinges on
generalized notions such as these runs the risk of being at best oversimplified, and at worst incoherent. My targets here, then, should be more discretely defined. By “modernism” I mean a set of philosophical presumptions about the formal, rational structure of ideas that relate to the world
and our ability to access and understand these structures.6 These presumptions have held sway, more or less, since the Enlightenment.7 My references to “liberalism” are perhaps more problematic in that the term is so
often used in reference to disparate and often contradictory concepts associated with political theory and law.8 In my discussion below, I concentrate on a conception of the good that embeds a form of market capitalism
and laissez-faire economics into the political and legal structures that are
found in society.9 This might be called “traditional liberalism.”10 This
crypto-normative presumption in favor of capitalist economic structures
shows up in certain forms of liberal political theory that favor the sorts of
4. Two excellent books have been written on this during the last century. See generally Charles
Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (rev. ed., Cornell U. Press 1947); Francis
D. Wormuth, The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism (Harper & Bros. 1949).
5. McIlwain, supra n. 4; Wormuth, supra n. 4.
6. See e.g. Bernard Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities: Epochal Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Social and Political Thought (U. of Notre Dame Press 1997).
7. Id.
8. See e.g. F. A. Hayek, Liberalism, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the
History of Ideas 119–51 (The U. of Chi. Press 1982).
9. Id. at 119.
10. Id. at 138–39.
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constitutional mechanisms I discuss in detail below.11 My use of these
concepts in the present context is, in a sense, instrumental. By showing
how these versions of modernism and liberalism guide constitutional founders to a particular notion of the good,12 I hope to illuminate why accepting
modern constitutionalism uncritically is problematic.13 In my view, contemporary societies that engage in formative or re-formative moments are
treading on dangerous ground if they accept and employ this uncritical and
formulaic notion of constitutionalism.
II. THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalism has at least two distinct meanings.14 It means, in one
sense, the actual forces and composition of society. When one asks, “How
is a society constituted?” she is using the term in this sense. Used in this
way, the concept is meant to capture the actual forces—cultural, economic,
legal, political, and social—which comprise the nation in question.15 This
is a more textured, albeit more amorphous and difficult to define conceptualization of the term.16 Alternatively, when one talks about the “constitution of a society” she invariably means just the formal written document17
in which the superficial structure of the state institutions are set forth.18
This is a distinctly formalist notion of constitutionalism.19
It is important to note in what sense one uses the concept of constitutionalism. Contemporary commentators often confuse and conflate the
11. Infra pts. III-VII.
12. Both of these concepts are, of course, incredibly complex and contestable at some level. Nonetheless, I find the present constructions defendable (on usage and reasonableness grounds) and useful
for my present endeavor. See Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of
Modernity (Simon & Shuster 1982) (discussing the use of “modernism” as a philosophical concept);
Patrick Neal, Liberalism and its Discontents (N.Y. U. Press 1997) (discussing the use of “liberalism” as
a philosophical concept).
13. See also David T. ButleRitchie, Critiquing Modern Constitutionalism, 3 Appalachian J.L. 37
(2004).
14. Lane, supra n. 1, at 5-11.
15. Lane calls this the second constitutional context. Lane, supra n. 1, at 10-11.
16. I discuss this in much more detail elsewhere. See David T. ButleRitchie, Shifting Foundations
and Historical Contingencies: A Critique of Modern Constitutionalism (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
U. of Or. Aug. 2004) (on file with author).
17. A notable exception, of course, would be the English constitution. See Edmund Burke, The
Philosophy of Edmund Burke 176 (The U. of Mich. Press 1967); Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution 417 (10th ed., St. Martin’s Press 1961) (discussing the English
constitution, not as a single document but as a series of proclamations and accords).
18. In Lane’s formulation, this is the first constitutional context. See Lane, supra n. 1, at 10-11.
19. Frank I. Michelman, Can Constitutional Democrats be Legal Positivists? Or Why Constitutionalism?, 2 Constellations 293, 296 (1996); see James W. Ceaser, Reconstructing Political Science, in A
New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society 41, 43 (Stephen L. Elkin &
Karol Edward Soltan eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993).
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term, attempting to capture both meanings (more or less), while not checking to see whether their use maintains a sense of consistency and coherence.20 It is, in fact, the ambiguous and sloppy use of the concept that
permits the superficial application of formalist constitutional structures on
top of the actual practices and structures of complex social groups.21 In
effect, when the two senses of constitutionalism are conflated the important aspects of the culture, history, and social structure of a nation are
drowned beneath the formalist impulse. Content is subsumed and inundated by form.
Interestingly, the two senses of the concept that I mention above correspond fairly closely with the division between ancient and modern constitutionalism.22 Ancient constitutionalism focused primarily on the nature of
the social group, looking at the normative questions which impact that
group.23 “What was the history of the Spartan people?”, for instance, or
“Were the economic forces which led Corsica to an agrarian economy
formative in their culture?” These were the types of questions that ancient
constitutionalists such as Aristotle and Cicero asked.24 These sorts of
questions can be contrasted with the formalist and instrumental perspectives of modern constitutionalists such as John Locke,25 James Madison,26
and Hans Kelsen.27 This latter group, along with very many political and
legal theorists who have followed them, concentrates invariably on the
second notion of constitutionalism I mention above.
So why have we lost this focus on the actual composition of society,
on the normative questions (concerning what a just and proper order of
economic and social resources would be, perhaps) that affect the actual
workings of state power, and focused on the formalisms inherent in institutional structure? I suggest that this move is tied to the whole-scale embrace of modernist presumptions about rational order and the impossibility
of substantive social and political discourse.28 In his study of the effects of
20. Lane, supra n. 1, at 5.
21. See ButleRitchie, supra n. 16.
22. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 1-2 (tracing this split a bit earlier to the division between Greek
and Roman variants of constitutionalism; acknowledging, however, that the real division does not take
hold until the modern period).
23. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 1-2.
24. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 2-3.
25. See e.g. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge U. Press 1988).
26. See e.g. Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (Modern Library n.d.).
27. See e.g. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Michael Hartney trans., Clarendon Press
1991).
28. Jürgen Habermas has been attempting to show how such discourse is not only compatible with
the constitutionalist enterprise (and as such supportive of liberal political theories concerning democracy and economics), but is actually necessary in order to have these things. See e.g. Jürgen Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William

File: ButleRitchie-Macroed

2004

Created on: 12/2/2004 9:54:00 AM

Last Printed: 12/10/2004 10:08:00 AM

THE CONFINES OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

5

modernism on social and political theory, Stephen Toulmin has said, “the
research program of modern philosophy . . . set aside all questions about
argumentation—among particular people in specific situations, dealing
with concrete cases, where varied things were at stake—in favor of proofs
that could be set down in writing, and judged as written.”29 The rationalism of the Enlightenment was an attempt to harness and categorize the
world.30 This led to advances in science and mathematics, and had a palpable effect on our social world as well.31 As Toulmin put it, “[t]he comprehensive system of ideas about nature and humanity that formed the
scaffolding of Modernity was thus a social and political, as well as a scientific device: it was seen as conferring Divine legitimacy on the political
order of the sovereign nation-state.”32
Western political theory has, in the last two hundred years or so, reduced the social and political content of societies to a small set of procedural safeguards and institutional mechanisms.33 This can be traced to the
influence of liberal political theories that arose during the enlightenment.34
The rationalism of the enlightenment had an enormous impact on social
and political theory.35 The effect on political theory was perhaps as dramatic as on science and mathematics.36 As Stephen Toulmin has said:
The idea that society is a formal “system” of agents or institutions
has exerted a major influence on the modern world. It was hinted
at by Hugo Grotius . . . in 1625, even before Descartes published;
but its detailed content, and underlying assumptions, only took on
definitive shape later in the 17th century. At this point, the Cartesian division of matter from mind, causes from reasons, and nature
from humanity, was endorsed and continued by Isaac Newton, and

Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1996); Jürgen Habermas, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of
Law and Democracy, 3 Eur. J. Phil. 12 (1995).
29. Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity 31 (The U. of Chi. Press
1990).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 128.
32. Id.
33. Lane, supra n. 1, at 41; see Stephen L. Elkin, Constitutionalism: Old and New, in A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society 20, 24 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol
Edward Soltan eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993).
34. Lane, supra n. 1, at 25-50; see Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension 9-113 (Alan
Rosenbaum ed., Greenwood Press 1988) (the essays in Part I); Karol Edward Soltan, Generic Constitutionalism, in A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society 70 (Stephen
L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993).
35. See e.g. Yack, supra n. 6; Toulmin, supra n. 29.
36. Toulmin, supra n. 29, at 107.
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ceased to be of concern to natural philosophers alone. From then
on, it played a major role in social and political thought as well.37
This, then, is the crucible of what has been called modern constitutionalism.38
III. THE CORNERSTONES OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Modern constitutionalism, as I use the term throughout the rest of this
project, refers to a set of formal legal and political concepts that were developed in Western Europe during the enlightenment.39 These concepts,
which serve as cornerstones of liberal political and legal theory (and
evolved to support that theory), are the division and limitation of governmental power, the recognition and protection of certain individual rights,
the protection of private property, and the notion of representative or democratic government.40 These concepts are the backdrop against which the
modern constitutionalist enterprise is judged. The extent to which a system
recognizes, legitimates, and entrenches these fundamental principles of
social and political organization marks it as either liberal (in those systems
which do recognize, legitimate, and entrench these concepts) or illiberal (in
those that do not). The history of the twentieth century has shown us how
stark this demarcation can be, and the ghastly results that can occur when
the division yields totalitarian results.41 Nonetheless, the trend that has
developed during the last two centuries or so seems to be that these liberal
values can only truly be protected by the development and institution of a
certain sort of constitutionalist model.42
This does not explain, however, why contemporary political and legal
theorists assume that a formal constitutional document will suffice. In
other words, even if we accept the fact that the values that are inherent in
liberalism are of enduring and universal value, and are therefore worthy of
protection, why must we accept that a formalist constitution is the best (or,
indeed, the only) way to accomplish these goals? Further, even if we accept the argument that a constitutional document along modernist lines is
necessary (or just even useful), it by no means follows that it is sufficient
37. Id.
38. Lane, supra n. 1, at 25-50.
39. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 3-4.
40. Infra pts. III-VII.
41. See Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933 – 1944
(Harper & Row 1942) (discussing totalitarianism).
42. Gordon J. Schochet, Introduction: Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of Politics, in
Constitutionalism: Nomos XX 1-15 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y. U. Press 1979).
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to accomplish the goals of protecting liberal values.43 In fact, this is precisely the problem. Contemporary theorists assume (either unconsciously
or with some willful blindness) that a formal constitutional document will
suffice to protect liberal values and inscribe them upon the society being
constituted.44 I would even go so far as to maintain that this is precisely
why and how the international community (both governmental and nongovernmental) operates vis-à-vis incipient nation-states.45 As Bernard
Yack has acknowledged, “written constitutions are often attempts to establish . . . what are seen as rational principles of government.”46 The sense
seems to be that if a formal constitution that incorporates liberal concepts
is instituted, the rest will take care of itself in time. On its face this seems
an unwarranted and faulty conclusion. Yet this is precisely what passes for
most constitutionalist discourse today.47
In what follows I will briefly discuss the four cornerstones of modern
constitutionalism, tracing their development and entrenchment in an attempt to substantiate my claim that their application has frequently led to
the sort of conflation and formalism that I critique above. I begin by looking at the notion of divided and limited government. This concept, made
popular during the Middle Ages in Europe, sets the stage for a particular
conception of civil society; a conception which sets the individual in opposition to society in a antagonistic way.48 This view, of course, was developed most fully during the seventeenth century by John Locke.49 I then
move to the dependent concepts of individual liberties and property rights.
These expectations further cordon off the individual from civil society in a
way that (perhaps forever) solidified our notions of individuals against the
state.50 The constellation of ideas surrounding individual rights and liberties has molded (if not contorted) modern constitutionalism in an unmistakable way. In a similar way, the modern notion of property ownership,
with its restrictions against state intervention and the expectation of invio-

43. See Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World xix (Douglas
Greenberg et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 1993).
44. See Schochet, supra n. 42.
45. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Into the Heart of the State: Intervention Through ConstitutionMaking, 8 Temp. Intl & Comp. L.J. 315, 317 (1994).
46. Yack, supra n. 6, at 100.
47. This is particularly true amongst the work of political scientists. See The Constitution of Good
Societies (Karol Edward Soltan & Stephen L. Elkin eds., The Pa. St. U. Press 1996); A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward
Soltan, eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va.
L. Rev. 771 (1997) (showing legal theorists are not immune to this impulse).
48. Hayek, supra n. 8, at 119-23.
49. Locke, supra n. 25, at 77-133.
50. Id.
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lability, has left an indelible mark on modern constitutionalism.51 Finally,
I briefly look at the rise of representative democracy in the context of constitutionalist discourse. It has been frequently noted that democracy and
constitutionalism are concepts that may in fact be contradictory.52 They
are, in any event, at least in tension with one another.53
It is important to note that none of the concepts that I identify as cornerstones of modern constitutionalism are intrinsically problematic. Indeed, countless works devoted to these ideas have been penned during the
last four hundred years that show their importance in certain contexts.54
What I mean to suggest here is that these ideas, as they developed and have
been implemented during the last century or more, are honored more in the
breach than in their actual application. Essentially, watered-down and
moribund approximations of these concepts have been articulated and employed in the context of constitution-making.55 The commitment to the
ideals is undermined by the superficiality and merely formalist move to try
and implement these political concepts in a universalizing and totalizing
way.56 Nothing can illustrate this better than the development of limited
government.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN MODERN
NATION-STATES
Constitutionalism, in virtually all of its formulations, plays on the concept that there are two levels of legal and political discourse. The first is
the fundamental law (or sometimes “higher” law) of a political entity.57
This is the constitution, proper. Below this is a second, subservient set of

51. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 124-27 (The U. of Chi. Press 1960).
52. See e.g. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (The U. of Chi. Press 1956); Lane,
supra n. 1, at 243-44.
53. Ronald Dworkin, Constitutionalism and Democracy, 3 Eur. J. Phil. 2 (1995); Lane, supra n. 1, at
ch. 11; Habermas, supra n. 28.
54. The corpus of Western liberalism is filled with such discussions. Theorists from Aristotle to
Unger have discussed these ideas in various contexts.
55. See ButleRitchie, supra n. 16.
56. It may be claimed, then, that I am really not taking issue with the concepts qua concepts, but
with their application. Fair enough. Being the legal realist that I am, however, leads me to cling to the
idea that a concept is only as good as it performs in application. Since the last century (at least) has
shown us that high ideals often yield despicable results, I am convinced that we must start with the
ideals and work forward to the results. Admittedly, this bucks the trend of starting with the undesirable
results and working back to the concepts. Such a procedure never seems to yield the proper effects,
though. As a result, I begin this examination of the sketchy application of these important constitutionalist concepts with the concepts in order to see if the problem lies not just in their incomplete and
superficial application, but in the heart of the concepts themselves.
57. Grey, supra n. 3, at 189-95.
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laws that are seen as derivations from the first.58 This hierarchy is what
gives modern constitutionalism its basic structure, and is why many (perhaps most) people see constitutionalism as a necessary step in the founding
(or re-founding) of a polity. This structure serves as a legitimation of government authority and is the basis of the rule of law. This institutional
structure is probably second nature to most of us. It is completely dependent, however, on the idea that government can, and should, be limited by
structural constraints contained in this fundamental or “higher” law; the
constitution.59
The idea that a constitution is designed to limit the power of the sovereign is quite old. Francis Wormuth has traced the concept back through
Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century,60 Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth,61
and finally to the Germanic tribes of the very early medieval period.62
Charles McIlwain disputes the claim of Teutonic heritage, instead maintaining that the idea arose first in Roman thought.63 He says, for instance:
[O]ne of the greatest contributions to constitutionalism was the
distinction [made by the Romans], more clearly than it had been
made before, or was to be made for long afterwards, between the
jus publicum and the jus privatum – a distinction that lies to this
day behind the whole history of our legal safeguards of the rights
of the individual against encroachment of government.64
McIlwain’s argument is persuasive, but ultimately the exact derivation
of the concept matters little for our present discussion. It was certainly the
case that Locke had accepted this dichotomy between state and the individual by the seventeenth century,65 and the notion that this split necessitated protections of the individual from the power of the state in the form
of limitations on governmental (or, more properly, sovereign) action was
firmly entrenched by the eighteenth century.66
As we can see here, there is a link between the hierarchical nature of
constitutional government and the split between public and private realms
of action. It is because individuals are seen as existing against the state
58. Michelman, supra n. 19, at 298.
59. Grey, supra n. 3, at 189-95.
60. See Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (Blackwell Press 1955).
61. See Question XC, On the Question of Law, in Summa Theologica in Introduction to St. Thomas
Aquinas (Anton C. Pegis ed., Modern Library 1948).
62. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at chs. 1, 4, 5. Lane seems to accept this view. See Lane, supra n. 1, at
19-21. Otto von Gierke also apparently endorsed this view as well. See McIlwain, supra n. 4, at ch. 3.
63. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 40-46.
64. Id. at 46.
65. See Locke, supra n. 25.
66. As evidenced, for example, by the work of Alexander Hamilton, et al., supra note 26. See also
Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 1.
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that limitations on government are needed.67 The two entities need to forge
a workable relationship allowing both to serve their proper ends. The fundamental law (the constitution) then, is seen as a compact between private
actors and the public power of the state.68 Key to this account is the notion
of sovereignty. While this is not the place to develop or trace a fullyfledged account of sovereignty,69 a little must be said here in order to show
how the notions of limited government and the public/private split on political actors intersect.70 In some ways, the notion of sovereignty may be
seen as a keystone holding this entire liberal conception of state and individual together.71
During the early modern period, the notion of state power was seen as
residing in a single individual, the monarch or sovereign. This is undoubtedly another legacy of imperial Roman practice. Sovereignty was the exercise of this power by the rightful authority of the state entity.72 As Thomas Hobbes put it, “[a]nd he that carryeth this person, is called Soveraigne,
and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his Subject.”73
This consolidation of sovereign power in one individual was endorsed and
espoused by Jean Bodin in his Six Books of the Commonwealth, and was
widely practiced by the monarchs of medieval Europe.74 Wormuth acknowledges this when he says, “[t]o Bodin, as to the whole school of
politiques, it appeared that the very existence of society was possible only
if there were some overriding power capable of exacting complete obedience from all subjects.”75
The arbitrary exercise of this power, however, was seen as a transgression against individual members of the state.76 Absolute power of the sort
espoused by Bodin and others necessarily meant that the sovereign was
above the law.77 For reasons obvious to us today, this was troubling for
many in medieval Europe. In fact, there existed an alternative view to the
one advanced by Bodin. This alternative view has been traced to the thir-

67. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 77-131.
68. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§113-14.
69. See J. Bartleson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge U. Press 1995); Georges Bataille, The
Accursed Share, Vols. II and III (Zone Books 1991); F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (2d. ed., Cambridge U.
Press 1986); S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton U. Press 1999).
70. For an interesting discussion that problematizes the public/private split, see Otto Kirchheimer, In
Quest of Sovereignty, 6 J. Pol. 139 (1944).
71. See Krasner, supra n. 69, at ch. 1.
72. See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Everyman’s Library 1965).
73. Id. at 90.
74. Lane, supra n. 1, at 44-50.
75. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 29.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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teenth century British jurist, Henry of Bracton.78 Bracton maintained that a
King above law was like a horse without a bridle.79 Indeed, McIlwain attributes directly to Bracton the very modern idea that a sovereign may only
exercise power legitimately when he does so according to law.80 He even
goes so far as to claim that the notion of sovereign power flowing from the
people to the sovereign, and that this relationship checks the power of the
sovereign to act arbitrarily in matters pertaining to the common good, was
first devised by Bracton.81
McIlwain describes this divorce as a division between jurisdictio and
gubernaculum.82 This is the division between the formal offices of government and the actual management of state. He traces the evolution of
this rift throughout the middle ages by examining the English common law
developments that limited the absolute power of the sovereign.83 During
this period, the British judiciary assumed an ever more powerful social
role. This increased stature gave judges the power to challenge the King
on issues concerning the governance of English society. In effect, the English judiciary bridled the sovereign between the thirteenth and sixteenth
centuries.84 The idea that a sovereign may only exercise his power legitimately when acting according to delimited powers under law was developed over several centuries.
Thomas Hobbes picked up this concept during the seventeenth century.85 Francis Wormuth identifies this as a direct result of the English
civil war.86 In any event, Hobbes’ famous Leviathan87 was aimed at addressing the arbitrary abuse of power, and constructing the proper ordering
of the public sphere.88 Here, we see the first real move to formalize constitutionalist principles. Hobbes was a materialist and formalist by temperament, and saw the relationship between state and the individual in rationalist terms.89 According to his view, the sovereign and his subjects maintain
a legal relationship, one of agency.90 While the legal characterization of
this relationship was an important one for Hobbes, he did not suppose that
the nature of the relationship itself was sufficient to cast the rights and re78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 67-68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ch. 5.
Id.
Id.
See Hobbes, supra n. 72.
Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 57, 59.
Hobbes, supra n. 72.
See id. at chs. 17-25.
See e.g. Michael Ridge, Hobbesian Public Reason, 108 Ethics 538 (1998).
See generally Hobbes, supra n. 72, at ch. 18.
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sponsibilities of both parties in stone.91 This is why limitations on the
power of the state were so important. Limitation on state power was accomplished by constructing a contractual relationship between the sovereign and the individual - the social contract.92 The social contract was a
fiction designed to orient the terms of state limitation.93 This notion of the
social contract would play a pivotal role in the development of the modern
state system, a notion that was picked up by (among others) John Locke.94
As I have said, the idea of a social contract was developed to explain
and describe this rationalist vision of state ordering along formalist lines.95
The nature of political ordering was seen, in this formulation, as nothing
more than a natural and logical legal relationship.96 The sovereign acts as
agent for his subjects. This agency relationship justifies the continued
maintenance of the social contract. In other words, the power of the sovereign is dependent on the recognition and protection of private ends.97 Constitutions are important in this account because they explicitly set forth the
terms by which the agency relationship can be exercised.98 The social contract is, after all, a contract. As Locke puts it:
Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the
political power of another without his consent, which is done by
agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for
their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another,
in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security
against any that are not of it.99
While Locke did not develop a fully formed notion of the social contract,100 as did other liberal theorists,101 he relied on the idea heavily in his
conceptualization of the proper relationship between the state and its subjects. In fact, it may reasonably be said that the entire corpus of Locke’s
political work was devoted to justifying the restraint of sovereign power.102
91. Id.; McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 125.
92. See generally Social Contract Essays by: Locke, Hume, Rousseau Intro (Ernest Barker ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1976).
93. Id.
94. See Locke, supra n. 25.
95. See generally Yack, supra n. 6; Toulmin, supra n. 29.
96. See generally Yack, supra n. 6; Toulmin, supra n. 29.
97. See generally Lane, supra n. 1, chs. 2, 3.
98. Id.
99. Locke, supra n. 25, at 164.
100. Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State 23 (The Free Press 1957).
101. See Social Contract Essays by: Locke, Hume, Rousseau, supra n. 92.
102. See generally Leslie Armour, John Locke and American Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension, supra n. 34, at 9.
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The state was, for Locke, a necessary condition to the full actualization of
the individual, but as an institution it should be constrained and narrowly
confined to providing the conditions for liberty.103 Confining the state to
its limited role, according to Locke, is what creates room for liberty to
flourish. This has been identified as Locke’s notion of constitutionalism; a
theory which is deeply tied to his metaphysics and epistemology.104
The next major player in this tale is Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron
de Montesquieu.105 Montesquieu accepted the Lockean notion of limited
government.106 He said, for example, that:
[C]onstant experience shows us that every man invested with
power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will
go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need
of limits? To prevent this abuse it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A constitution may be such that no man shall be compelled to do things
which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from
things which the law permits.107
Montesquieu also began his analysis of constitutionalist ideas from a rationalist stance.108 At the very beginning of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu said “[t]here is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations
subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one
another.”109 Guy Lafrance has said that for Montesquieu, “[t]here is fundamentally a concern for scientificity, a concern for positive knowledge
which is constantly expressed in the desire to link up the law with sociohistorical data.”110 There is evidence to suggest that Montesquieu was much
closer to Jean-Jacques Rousseau concerning his views on the connection of
a form of government to a specific people,111 but his rationalist tendencies
are relevant here. So what does Montesquieu’s rationalism add to this constitutionalist picture? It is Montesquieu who introduces the concept of
further diluting the notion of sovereignty by separating the powers of gov-

103. Locke, supra n. 25, at 164, 189, 190; see Lane, supra n. 1, at 51-53.
104. See Armour, supra n. 102 (detailed account of what motivates Locke to adopt this set of positions).
105. See Robert Shackleton, Essays on Montesquieu and the Enlightenment (Voltaire Found. 1988).
106. Guy Lafrance, Montesquieu and Rousseau on Constitutional Theory, in Constitutionalism: The
Philosophical Dimension, supra n. 34, at 55.
107. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws bk. XI, ch. 4, 150 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publg.
Co. 1949) (originally published 1773).
108. Lafrance, supra n. 106, at 55.
109. Montesquieu, supra n. 107, at bk. I, ch. 1, 1.
110. Lafrance, supra n. 106, at 55.
111. Id.
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ernment into different departments.112 This is a further compartmentalization and limitation of the structure and role of government, reductions further carried out by the institution of a positivist constitutional text.113
The last major focus in this evolution is on the works of Thomas
Paine114 and James Madison.115 It was the work of the American founders,
more than any single theorist before, who unified previous rationalist visions into a coherent whole.116 Paine captured clearly the founders’ view
on constitutionalism when he said that a written constitution is “to liberty,
what a grammar is to language.”117 A vital part of Paine’s view is that a
constitution is a formal and antecedent document that necessarily precedes
the institution of government.118 To this, Madison added the notion that
this compact that predates the formation of the state must incorporate the
constraint of limited and divided government, accepting in whole cloth the
views of Locke and Montesquieu.119 He further developed these notions,
however, by adding the proviso that the divided powers should be checked
against one another, a further limiting device.120 Madison also endorsed
the view, derived undoubtedly from Locke,121 that the people are the
source of sovereign power, and that the constitution is a grant of that power
to the government.122 Limiting government through discrete mechanisms
designed to diffuse and disperse power so that individuals in society can
attain private ends was the goal of the American founders.123 Richard Kay
has explained this in the following way: “These two elements—first, that
there is a proper and improper use of state authority and, second, that the
means of confining its exercise to proper uses are the promulgation and
enforcement of positive law [through a constitutional document]—remain
the defining features of American constitutionalism.”124 There is a positivist and overly rationalistic impulse shot through most of the early Ameri-

112. See Lane, supra n. 1, at 54; Lafrance, supra n. 106, at 61.
113. See e.g. David Spitz, Some Animadversions on Montesquieu’s Theory of Freedom, 63 Ethics 207
(1953).
114. See e.g. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951).
115. Hamilton, supra n. 26.
116. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution ch. 3
(Knopf Books 1996).
117. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 2.
118. Id. at 9.
119. James W. Muller, The American Framers’ Debt to Montesquieu, in The Revival of Constitutionalism 91 (James W. Muller ed., U. of Neb. Press 1988).
120. Lane, supra n. 1, at 55-56.
121. Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations
18 (Larry Alexander ed., Cambridge U. Press 1998).
122. Hamilton, supra n. 26, at 294.
123. Rakove, supra n. 116, at ch. 3.
124. Kay, supra n. 121, at 19.
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can constitutionalist discourse.125 Michael Kammen has described this as
the impulse to create “a machine that would go of itself.”126
We see throughout the modern period several interdependent concepts
that have played key roles in the development of modern constitutionalism.
Clearly the belief that government should be limited in its ability to use its
power against individuals is the chief concern of modern political thinkers.
In order for this concept to take hold, however, several related concepts
needed to develop. First the dichotomy between state and subject had to
take root. Then the idea that sovereignty can (and should) be divorced
from an all-powerful monarch was needed. Once power was divested from
the sovereign and deposited amongst the people, the mechanisms of divided government and checks and balances would ensure that it remained
there. In theory, the division of powers can be seen as a sort of entropy
that undermines any possibility of consolidating government power in the
hands of a few. Finally, the notion that the proper relationship between the
individual and the weakened sovereign was one of agency solidified the
now widely held belief that the only legitimate end of the nation-state is to
serve the needs of the individual so that she can attain private interests.
In making these moves, theorists like Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu
and the American founders continually delineated and redacted legitimate
state functions, which posited ever smaller and confined areas of public
action. The law and the constitution which enabled the law, are simply a
means to an end—a very particular end.127 The constitution is a charter. In
this modernist formulation, writing a constitution is nothing more than
reducing the contract between the state and the individual to a formal
document.128 This has had a tremendous impact on the history of constitutionalism, and I would go so far as to say that it dominates the conception
that most constitutionalists have of founding acts today. Constitutions are,
in important respects, foundational.129 They certainly do set out the basic
relationship between individuals and the state. This impulse cannot be
resisted too fervently. But neither can we afford to turn this impulse into
an ontology.
125. Charles R. Kelser, The Founders and the Classics, in Muller, supra n. 119, at 62.
126. Michael G. Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture
(Knopf Books 1986); see also Yack, supra n. 6, at 109.
127. Schochet, supra n. 42, at 8.
128. A manifestation of this can be found in the desire to quantify aspects of constitutionalism, and to
design templates that can be used to write constitutions. For the former, see Hene Van Maarseveen &
Ger Van Der Tang, Written Constitutions: A Computerized Comparative Study (Oceana 1978). Examples of the latter can be found in Albert P. Blaustein, Framing the Modern Constitution: A Checklist
(Phila. Const. Found. 1993) and Bernard H. Siegan, Drafting a Constitution for a Nation of Republic
Emerging into Freedom (2d ed., George Mason U. Press 1994).
129. Jacques Derrida, The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration, in For Nelson Mandela 13 (Jacques Derrida & Tlili Mustapha eds., Seaver Books 1987).
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An important part of my critique is the setting in motion of a belief that
these ideas are both necessary and sufficient. All throughout the work of
Hobbes, Locke, and the American founders, we see an emphasis on the
restraints and formalist conceptions of state and legal ordering. This is the
often-noted focus on negative liberty.130 In other words, there is an unstated presumption in liberal theory that creating the conditions for liberty
by restraining state power is enough. We never see a deeper appreciation
of the need for positive conditions that enable individuals to attain the sorts
of private ends that liberal theorists champion.131 Nor do we see any connection between the positivist constitutional structures and the cultural,
social, and historical situation of states being constituted. It must be noted
in the context of the present discussion that the liberal insistence on limited
government, with its corollaries of popular sovereignty and the split between public and private actors, proceeds from the tacit assumption that
such restriction is sufficient to create the conditions under which liberty
can thrive.132 In my view, it is the focus on these issues that has led directly to the sort of superficial and ineffectual constitutional documents we
have seen during the last century.
A related, and perhaps dependent development in liberal political theory has had an enormous effect on the development of constitutionalism
during the modern period - the institution of individual rights.133 The development of individual rights regimes has dominated political and legal
theories for centuries, and as will be seen in the next section, I believe that
the way in which they are implemented mirrors the formulaic move outlined above.
V. MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
For the modernist political and legal project, structural constraints
through divided and limited government only provided so much protection.
These mechanisms, as has been said, diffused and enfeebled the institutions of government in a manner that created a space for individuals who
strove for a place against the state and its power. It was widely feared that
this would not be enough, and in the words of John Selden, “this little gap
of man’s liberty may in time go out.”134 This space needed a structure to
maintain itself, a set of mechanisms that would support the weight of indi130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Clarendon Press 1958).
Id.
Schochet, supra n. 42, at 4-8.
See Rights (Carlos Nino ed., N.Y. U. Reference Collection 1992).
Hayek, supra n. 51, at 205.
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vidual claims against further state intervention and encroachment. This
structure was provided by the concept of individual rights and liberties.135
The attachment of rights to individuals who are poised against state authority provides some recourse against illegitimate governmental overreaching.136 As Gary Bryner puts it, “[c]onstitutional governments are established primarily, in theory, to assure individual rights, and their constitutions are designed to assure governmental respect for those rights.”137 Discussing individual rights has become a cottage industry amongst liberal
political theorists.138 “Rights talk,” as it has come to be known, is virtually
synonymous with modern conceptions of constitutional government.139
Locke identified a narrow set of rights (“life, liberty and property”) as
preconditions for civil society.140 His conceptualization was derived from
his notion of natural law and was distinctly imbued with the idea that the
covenant between sovereign and subject was dependent on the maintenance of this moral pact.141 This was an idea that was later to play an important role in the rhetoric surrounding both the American Declaration of
Independence and the institution of the U.S. Constitution.142 This natural
law foundation for rights has lost its luster, however. During the last 150
years or so, most political and legal theorists have derived the foundation
for basic conceptions of rights from the need to further protect individuals
from arbitrary state power, not from any universal conception of natural
law.143 Again, the mechanisms employed to provide this protection are
abstract and formal in nature. Seen in this way, they are little more than
extensions of the basic liberal program of putting government in its proper
place.144 In short, they are rules restricting government action; simply put,
positive protections against state encroachments.145
Joel Feinberg has said that a “man has a legal right when the official
recognition of his claim (as valid) is called for by the governing rules.”146
In this context, the constitutional text provides the governing rules. In or135. See Rights, supra n. 133.
136. See Gary C. Bryner, Constitutionalism and the Politics of Rights, in Constitutionalism and
Rights (Gary C. Bryner & Noel B. Reynolds eds., Brigham Young U. Press 1987).
137. Id. at 7.
138. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U. Press 1977).
139. Dworkin says, for instance, that constitutionalism is “a system that establishes individual legal
rights that the dominant legislature does not have the power to override or compromise.” Dworkin,
supra n. 53, at 2.
140. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 22-23.
141. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 22-23; Armour, supra n. 102, at 24-27.
142. Armour, supra n. 102, at 24-27.
143. See generally Schochet, supra n. 42.
144. Rakove, supra n. 116, at 18-19.
145. Id.
146. Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, in Philosophy of Law 304, 311 (Joel Feinberg &
Jules Coleman eds., 7th ed., Wadsworth 2004).
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der for an individual to have the opportunity to pursue private ends, the
governing rules set out by the contract between the individual and the state
must explicitly define and acknowledge basic rights.147 In this formulation,
rights are legal fictions that protect certain interests that are deemed to be
important in the context of the political and social community.148 This is a
purely abstract and procedural conception that shuns the substance of
rights bearing. This is contrasted with the more robust conception of rights
based in moral discourse.149 As Habermas explains, “the legal community,
which is always localized in space and time, protects the integrity of its
members precisely insofar as they acquire the artificial status of rightsbearers.”150 Rights here, properly speaking “constitutional rights,” are
positivist structures that give individuals certain claims to safe space in
which to pursue their own visions of the good.151 Roberto Unger explains
it this way:
[This] cluster of entitlements creates an island of security against
the predatory or reformist actions of the state, a haven in which
some material or ideal interest, and the actual person who is its
bearer, can hide. So long as it remains within its protected zone,
the interest cannot be struck dead. Conversely, this operation immobilizes a parcel of the state’s capacity to move and shake the
social world.152
To use Ronald Dworkin’s language, a right is a trump against the intervention into this vision of the good by government action.153
In forging the compact between individual and the state, it has become
widespread practice to presume that the rights of individuals should be
prominently guarded and entrenched.154 But how do we know how big a
space to carve out in order for individuals to seek their own ends? In other
words, what rights should a constitutional document protect? This is the
source of a good deal of debate, especially amongst contemporary constitutional founders.155 The seat of contention seems to be between what have

147. Dworkin, supra n. 138, at 184.
148. Id.
149. Id. at ch. 10.
150. Habermas, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy, supra n. 28, at
14.
151. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity:Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service
of Radical Democracy 131 (Verso 2001).
152. Id.
153. Dworkin, supra n. 138, at ch. 7.
154. Id.
155. See e.g. Albie Sachs, Speech, Some Lessons from the South African Experience of Constitutionmaking: The Role of the Constitutional Court in Reconciling People in a Divided Society (Mansion
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been called “negative” and “positive” rights.156 In order not to derail my
focus on the effect that rights (in the broadest sense of the term) have had
on the modern institution of constitutionalism, let me simply note that this
distinction concentrates on the difference between protecting individuals
from encroachment and enabling them to achieve their ends by providing
the conditions necessary for them to achieve these ends, the difference
between form and substance. I believe this debate is overly Manichean,157
focusing too much on what defines the good.158 In any event, for our purposes here, it is enough to say that constitutional founders invariably attempt to enumerate certain types of rights: rights to political participation,159 rights to the freedoms of thought and speech,160 rights to engage in
certain types of relationships (particularly economic relationships),161 and
rights to exist and thrive in the community162 are all common in constitutional documents.
I maintained at the outset of this paper that all four of the cornerstones
of modern constitutionalism (of which liberal conceptions of rights is the
second) serve to lead constitutional founders to a superficial understanding
of their task. Positivist conceptions of individual rights are perhaps the
clearest example of my point. By embracing a limited number of basic
rights (the number fluctuates between a dozen or so, in the American version, to several dozen, in some European constitutions), contemporary
founders presume that the conditions for creating a healthy and robust civil
society are satisfied. Scant discussion is had, however, concerning the
ability of individuals to effectively use these enumerated rights.
Rights have become the boilerplate of the modern constitution.163 In
order to be accepted as legitimate by other actors, invariably governmental
and nongovernmental actors on the international stage, an incipient consti-

House, Dublin, Oct. 21, 1996) (copy of text of this lecture can be found online at: http://rcswww.urz.tudresden.de/~schrenk/research.htm (last viewed Oct. 20, 2004)).
156. Berlin, supra n. 130.
157. For a good discussion taking a similar stance, see Richard L. Lippke, The Elusive Distinction
Between Negative and Positive Rights, 33 S. J. Phil. 335 (1995).
158. Hayek, supra n. 51, at ch. 1.
159. Examples include Article II of the Constitution of the French Federal Republic of 1958; Article
21 of the German Basic Law; and Article 50 of the Constitution of Norway.
160. Examples include the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Article 5 of the German Basic
Law; and Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, incorporated into the
Constitution of the Fifth French Republic of 1958 through Article 2, paragraph 1.
161. Examples would be the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Articles 14
and 15 of the German Basic Law; Article 17 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen; and
Articles 104-107 of the Constitution of Norway.
162. See Article 12 of the German Basic Law; Articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Constitution of the Fourth
French Republic of 1946.
163. Lane, supra n. 1, at 137-42.
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tution must contain an enumerated list of certain rights.164 If the document
contains those rights, it is accepted as a legitimate attempt to incorporate
liberal notions of liberty. This judgment is made regardless of the connection of these rights to the actual conditions on the ground in a forming or
re-forming polity. In other words, just because the language of rights is
incorporated into a founding document, founders (and others) presume that
liberty will flow as a natural and invariable consequence. One need only
look at the recent history of modern constitutionalism to see the scrapheap
of constitutional texts which contained such enumerated lists of rights that
failed to either protect the members of the society, or establish an enduring
polity to substantiate this position.165
An excellent illustration of this is the specific guarantees that are invariably incorporated into modernist constitutional documents protecting
the right to own property. While these particular sets of rights166 are
somewhat contentious in contemporary discourse,167 they have always
played an important role in the conception of modern constitutionalism that
I have developed above. I next turn to a discussion of these rights, focusing further on how their entrenchment has further formalized the positivist
enterprise of the enlightenment.
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN THE SCHEMA
OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
As I noted at the outset of the last section, John Locke identified the
right to own property as central to his notion of liberal society.168 This
identification of private property ownership with liberal conceptions of the
relationship between sovereign and citizen runs deep in the West.169 It has
been identified as one of the primary motivating factors of the American
founders, who thought that “the protection of private property . . . is conducive of progress, order and justice.”170 Jefferson, among others, seemed
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. I characterize private property protections as “a set of rights” because the notion of private
ownership hinges on a panoply of interdependent concepts. Without the correlative rights of contract
and other economic protections the right to own property would be meaningless. For a good discussion
of this see Anthony Ogus, Property Rights and Freedom of Economic Activity, in Constitutionalism
and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad 125-50 (Louis Henkin & Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., Columbia U. Press 1990).
167. See e.g. Radical Philosophy of Law: Contemporary Challenges to Mainstream Legal Theory
and Practice (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold eds., Humanities Press 1995).
168. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 26, 31, 34, 37, 41, 42.
169. Hayek, supra n. 8, at 123.
170. Gotfried Dietz, In Defense of Property 199 (Henry Regnery, Co. 1963).
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to believe that protecting private ownership of property is a prerequisite of
freedom.171 Liberalism hinges in large part on society recognizing and
protecting private property rights.172 The recognition of this right, often in
absolutist terms, drives and reinscribes the alienation of the individual
from the state.173 In other words, this is a concrete manifestation of the
public/private dichotomy discussed above. Positing a right to own property, though, does not lead to the inevitability that individuals in the state
can or will be able to own property. Like the notions of divided and limited government, and the more general concept of individual rights discussed above, the private property rights enunciated in most constitutional
documents are merely positivist ideals of a strictly formal sort.174 I will
briefly outline the arguments that many supporters of such rights advance.
Once this is accomplished, I will examine the presumption that purely
positive protections contained in a constitutional text can affect the sort of
connection between concept and reality that many constitutionalists assume. As I maintain throughout, I believe this to be unlikely at best.
The story that Locke tells about the relationship between the individual
and the state is a compelling one. He builds upon the space created for
individual action (by wresting political power away from the sovereign) by
vesting the newly liberated individual with certain inalienable attributes.175
Principle among these is the right to own and maintain property.176 In fact,
the primary role of the state is to ensure that others do not encroach upon
this right. If this right is protected, in Locke’s account, industrious individuals could pursue their own ends with the assurance that their labor
would be secure.177 The contract between state and the individual made
the sovereign the protector of the individual’s property.178 This is the
foundation of an economic system that is independent of state control or
governmental apparatus.179 For Locke, as for many who followed him, the
zone of individual action created by the constitutionalist structure would be
filled by the private economy of free and autonomous individuals seeking

171. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe
and America 259 (4th ed., Blaisdell Publishing Co. 1968). James Madison agreed. See Bryner, supra
n. 136, at 12. Alexander Hamilton was apparently of this opinion as well. See Paul Eidelberg, The
Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers
126 (The Free Press 1968).
172. Unger, supra n. 151, at 21.
173. Louis Althusser, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx 140-41 (Verso 1982).
174. Lane, supra n. 1, at 60.
175. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 22-23.
176. Id. at §§ 25-51.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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an ever larger part of the available resources.180 This economic account
was accepted and expanded upon by Adam Smith, who maintained that
this sort of system created the conditions for a healthy social system.181
There is another more basic justification for such a system, however, one
that focuses more clearly on the autonomy of the individual.
The conservative constitutional theorist Friedrich Hayek has maintained that private property is the primary protection against coercion.182
More than checking the power of government through structural mechanisms, or the more diffuse political liberties associated with general grants
of individual rights, then, the institutionalization of property protects the
individual as autonomous political actor from arbitrary political power.183
He draws this from a Kantian conception of individual autonomy that further entrenches the individualism inherent in modern constitutionalism.184
Important in this particular formulation is not that individuals actually control property (as one might presume), but that the instrumentality of its
possible control is divested from public actors.185 Autonomy means the
ability to possibly control one’s own ends through the accumulation of
private wealth. The private space becomes larger, and the sphere of legitimate state action continues to shrink.
This account was incorporated whole cloth into the American constitutional scheme.186 The American founders were preoccupied with the protection of a property ownership regime that vested nearly absolute authority in individuals who had property.187 Here a tension arises between the
selfish and the institutional reasons for implementing private property protections.188 Many of the founders were, of course, holders of vast amounts
of personal and private wealth and property.189 Many were also idealists,
however.190 When Madison wrote in The Federalist, No. 10 that the constitution should protect “different and unequal faculties of acquiring property” he was certainly attempting to justify the economic status quo, but he
180. Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 210 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999);
Unger, supra n. 151, at 21-22.
181. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 277-78 (Clarendon Press 1976); Hardin, supra n. 180, at 70.
182. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 140.
183. Id.
184. Ogus, supra n. 166, at 127.
185. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 140-41.
186. Rakove, supra n. 116, at chs. 1-3.
187. Walter Berns, The ‘New’ Science of Politics and Constitutional Government, in Constitutionalism and the Politics of Rights, supra n. 136, at 63-77; Bryner, supra n. 136, at 69.
188. Id.
189. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States ch. 5
(Macmillian 1986).
190. Rakove, supra n. 116, at 15.
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was also attempting to give expression to the ideas expressed by Locke
(and later by Kant and Hayek) that protecting this sort of scheme was the
best way to assure both the individual’s autonomy and the social space
within which the autonomous individual can seek the good.191 This space
would become, in modern parlance, “the market.”192
An important consequence of this scheme cannot be overlooked.
Theoretically, the private property regime developed to support the arguments in favor of a constitutionalist system advancing the freedom of individuals against the state, freedom in the form of individual autonomy and a
space of action (the market) for these autonomous individuals.193 But these
justifications are normative theories that suggest a connection to natural
rights that attach to all individuals. Private property regimes had a more
selfish justification, however. To guard against state intervention, minimal
formal (or negative) mechanisms designed to entrench property rights were
required. Protecting against governmental encroachment but maintaining a
certain type of market necessitated un-tethering the mechanisms of protecting property from the natural law theories supporting the rhetoric of Locke
and Smith. Positivist mechanisms guarding against intrusion by the sovereign (or others) on an already developing market were placed aside by, and
in fact justified by, the rhetoric of universal normative ideals.194 This is, in
my estimation, the root of the fundamental incoherence that makes constitutionalism so frail as an institution today.
Protecting private property is, in an ideal sense, a rational way of
maintaining the autonomy of individuals against arbitrary action by the
state, and theoretically creates a market in which these individuals can seek
their own visions of the good.195 This ideal must confront the realities of a
market that is already in development, however. The idealist rhetoric must
give way to the positivist realities of constitution building. Positing a specific regime of property ownership certainly guards against state intervention, but more importantly it entrenches the status quo in a concretizing
way.196 Such protections, as we can clearly see from Madison’s view, protect as much (perhaps more) against uncontrolled private redistributions of
191. See e.g. Schochet, supra n. 42.
192. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 69.
193. Rakove, supra n. 116, at 314-16.
194. Michael Walzer seems to recognize this tension. He suggests that the focus on property rights
undermines the more normative ideal of conscience. See Michael Walzer, Constitutional Rights and
the Shape of Civil Society, in The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society
116 (Robert E. Calvert ed., U. of Kan. Press 1991).
195. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 222-28.
196. As Unger explains, “[t]he legal rights and governmental institutions sustaining them made
possible a basic continuity of the elites. In their historical setting, the engrossment of leaseholds and
the factory system represented advances in the degree of command over large pools of land, capital,
and labor that could be exercised by large-scale enterprises.” Unger, supra n. 151, at 288.
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property during or after regime change as they do against arbitrary state
action. In Roberto Unger’s words, “the constitution [is] a device by which
to exhibit and sustain some determinate scheme of social division and hierarchy.”197 In this context (and perhaps others as well) the aspirations of
modern constitutionalism are supported by normative imperatives but put
into action by positivist mechanisms. This tension is not accidental. Constitutional texts are not political and social ideals made concrete. They are
imperfect approximations at best, and given the fact that they are implemented mid-stream in the historical and cultural circumstances of a forming (or re-forming) polity, it is no wonder that the positivist nature of these
texts often have the effect of entrenching prevailing power structures (economic and political).
Here again this entrenchment is directly related to the rationalist impulse.198 By attempting to make universal a certain conception of property
ownership and protection, enlightenment theorists advanced a positivist
and formal constitutionalist structure that simplified and conflated the ideals contained in their rhetoric. As David Lea has said:
Modern constitutionalism’s preference for inflexible uniformity
has meant a constitution of equal citizens who theoretically are
treated identically, but not necessarily equitably. In actuality,
identical treatment has justified the abrogation of earlier accords
and the refusal to accept cultural and legal diversity, entailing the
ultimate denial of equitable treatment, as distinct cultural communities are pushed to assimilate within one dominant system.199
The enlightenment rationalism that I have discussed above, with its attendant focus on the positivist mechanisms employed in constitutional texts,
has a totalizing effect on political and social structures. The reductive
move and the universalistic impulse of rationalist political and social theory confines and impoverishes innovative ideas about political and legal
structure.
This account would seem to run in direct contradiction to the last cornerstone: democracy. Much of the critical literature on constitutionalism
suggests that it acts as a protective device for certain interests.200 I think
there is something profoundly true about this position. Constitutionalism,
modern constitutionalism in any event, is an inherently entrenching device.
If it is the case, then, that the theoretical confines of modern constitutionalism are delimited by rationally defined positivist mechanisms that entrench
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 573.
Toulmin, supra n. 29, at ch. 3.
David Lea, Tully and de Soto on Uniformity and Diversity, 19 J. Applied Phil. 55, 57 (2002).
Unger is of this opinion, for example. See generally Unger, supra n. 151.
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the political and economic status quo, would not the masses be able to affect this entrenchment through the democratic process? Perhaps. This is
one reason why some maintain that constitutionalism and democracy are,
at a theoretical level, contradictory concepts.201 I include democracy as the
last major element of modern constitutionalism because it rounds out the
narrative of modern constitutionalist discourse. Its practice, like the practice of implementing rights regimes, is far different than the rhetoric of
idealist constitutional discourse. As will be seen in the next section, democracy helps sell the idea of constitutionalism, but the constraints built
into the democratic process by the typical modernist constitutional system
limits the effect of popular opinion.
VII. DEMOCRACY AS A TENET OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is more
tenuous and complicated than any of the other cornerstones that I have
identified. Some have maintained that the two concepts are complimentary, each enabling the other to flourish.202 Others, however, suggest that
the constraining and restricting nature (i.e., the positivity) of constitutionalism runs counter to democratic concepts.203 This debate is lively and active, showing some promise concerning the vitality of political theory in
the new millennium. My intention is not to play out the parameters of this
discourse, although I will set forth the basic positions as they are currently
articulated. Instead, I will attempt to show how a version of democracy
has frequently been sold as a corollary to the modernist vision of constitutionalism.204 If this perception is correct, democracy is seen as an outgrowth of constitutionalism. It is this relationship that allows for the confinement of democratic institutions that entrench power structures in certain ways. This confinement, if it is true, follows the other three major
aspects of constitutionalism that I have identified and discussed above.
A word of caution is necessary here. Democratic theory is rich and
varied. The debates surrounding what constitutes democracy, and how
democratic reforms can and should be structured, are perhaps the most
vibrant and vigorous of any in contemporary political theory.205 It would

201. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 2.
202. See Dworkin, supra n. 53.
203. Dahl, supra n. 52, at 90.
204. See Dworkin, supra n. 53.
205. See Noam Chomsky, Chomsky on Democracy and Education (C. P. Otero ed., RoutledgeFalmer
2003); Brook Manville, A Company of Citizens: What the First Democracy Teaches About Creating
Great Organizations (Harvard U. Press 2003); Social Movements and Democracy (Pedro Ibarra ed.,
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be impossible for me to do much justice to this debate here. I will confine
my analysis to the relationship between modern constitutionalist theory
and democratic concepts that implicate and intersect with the terms of constitutionalism.206 In so doing, I will focus primarily on the way that democratic reforms, as a corollary to constitutionalist structures, exhibit the
sort of rationalist, formalist and positivist impulses that I have developed
throughout this paper.
Democracy was a late addition to the idea of constitutionalism.207 The
incipient stages of modern constitutionalism (growing out of medieval and
renaissance structures related to rationalism) did not address the notion that
people can (or should) have a say in the affairs of state, either directly or
through representatives.208 As the notion of sovereignty was displaced,
however, it came to reside—in theory anyway—in “the people.”209 But
how would “the people” yield such important power given their diffuse
and scattered nature? This is, of course, the concept of popular sovereignty
that serves as the foundation for many articulations of democracy.210 The
answer to the question of how citizens in whom sovereignty is vested can
exercise that power is the principle locus of discussion amongst democratic
theorists.211
Even if the idea that sovereignty either resides with or emanates from
the people is accepted, it is by no means the case that it necessarily leads to
the conclusion that democracy is the form of government that should be
employed. Nonetheless, modern constitutionalism is frequently posited in
the context of discussions concerning democracy.212 One needs an independent rationalization for the adoption of a democratic system.213 During
the eighteenth century such rationalizations came from natural law theories
regarding the relationship of free and equal citizens in a rational civil society.214 The American founders placed a great deal of stock in this account.215 The implications of this sort of view could be far reaching, but as
Palgrave MacMillan 2003); L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History
(Kluwer Publg. 2003); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra n. 28; Hardin, supra n. 180.
206. Hardin, supra n. 180; see also Constitutionalism and Democracy: Studies in Rationality and
Social Change (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., Cambridge U. Press 1988); Constitutionalism and
Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, supra n. 43.
207. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 9.
208. Id.
209. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 152-56.
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also Key Concepts in Critical Theory: Democracy (Philip Green ed., Humanities Press
1993).
212. See Dworkin, supra n. 53.
213. Habermas, supra n. 28.
214. See Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 (Ernest
Barker trans., Cambridge U. Press 1934).
215. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 90 (Ohio U. Press 1987).
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with the other elements of constitutionalism the effect was truncated by the
restrictive and limited notions that were built into the idea as it was employed in practice. Democracy is an ideal, but from an institutional point
of view there have to be ways of employing it.216 The natural law notion
that “the people” are supreme is conflated and reduced to an institution (or
set of institutions) through which the will of the people (to use the eighteenth century terminology) can be yoked and determined. These institutions create the appearance of control by the people, but frequently insulate
the structures of state from actual democratic control. Democratic institutions, then, were built into the apparatus of modern constitutionalism.
The right to vote and have a say in the affairs of state were seen to be
granted by the charter between state and citizen.217 The natural law rhetoric provided a justification, but in practice democracy was in effect an element of constitutionalism. As I just hinted, democratic institutions were
nothing more than positivist structures that allowed for the determination
of popular sentiment. Such determinations were never seen to be controlling, however. They were always seen (and this is true even today) as informational rather than formational. This is clearly illustrated by the
checks on democracy that the American founders built into the American
constitutional system.218 The American founders were, by and large, distrustful of “the masses.”219 Democracy, in the sense of radical democratic
participation and will formation, was seen as destructive and troublesome.
But if democratic participation is seen as a structured institution that can
effect—yet not control—the state apparatus, it can be subsumed under the
positivist, formalist and institutionalized system of constitutionalism. Seen
in this way, democracy is a corollary of constitutionalism.220 Democracy is
a device designed to invest people in the institutions of constitutionalism.221 Ronald Dworkin has recently endorsed this position, claiming that
“constitutionalism is essential to creating a democratic community – to
constituting ‘the people’ – and there can be no communal, collective freedom without it.”222 Democracy, in this view, is dependent on constitutionalism.
There is another version of the relationship between constitutionalism
and democracy, however. This alternative view, espoused by—among
216. Hardin, supra n. 180, at ch. 7.
217. Id. at 157-59.
218. See George P. Fletcher, The Separation of Powers: A Critique of Some Utilitarian Justifications,
in Constitutionalism: Nomos XX, supra n. 3.
219. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 123, 144.
220. Lane, supra n. 1, at ch. 11.
221. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 10.
222. Id.
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others—the political scientist Robert Dahl,223 maintains that democracy
and constitutionalism are contradictory concepts.224 The basic argument is
that constitutionalism limits and constrains the actions of individuals in the
state (as I have maintained throughout).225 These constraints are not just
upon the state actors in government positions. All members of society are
constrained by the terms of the constitutionalist organs. For instance, individuals are constrained from infringing upon one another’s rights. Democracy, on the other hand, is majoritarian in principle. One commentator has
said that “[t]he positive ideals of democracy, popular participation, the rule
of public opinion, and the glorification of the common man all run up hard
against modern commitments to rationalism, efficiency, and the distrust of
mere opinion.”226 Dworkin explains it this way, “a strong objection has
been pressed against constitutionalism: that it subverts or compromises
democracy, because if a constitution forbids the legislation to pass a law
limiting freedom of speech, for example, that diminishes the democratic
right of the majority to have the law it wants.”227 In this view, which
Dworkin ultimately rejects,228 constitutionalism and democracy cannot
both be taken as fundamental and absolute. One must predominate; we can
see from the quote just above which Dworkin prefers.229
There have been attempts to reconcile this perceived conflict between
constitutionalism and democracy, most notably by Jürgen Habermas.230
Habermas views democracy and constitutionalism as being what he calls
“co-original.” By this he means that democracy and constitutionalism are
both fundamental, each necessary for the other to work properly but neither
deriving from the other.231 There is a reciprocal relationship between democracy and constitutionalism in this account. Democracy depends on a
robust notion of constitutionalism (note I have not said modern constitutionalism) and this robust notion of constitutionalism depends on a radical
democratic project.232 As Habermas puts it, “[t]he interdependence of constitutionalism and democracy comes to light in this complementary rela-

223. See e.g. Dahl, supra n. 52; see also Lane, supra n. 1, at 243-44.
224. Id.
225. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 10.
226. Yack, supra n. 6, at 107-08.
227. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 2.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 10.
230. Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union or Contradictory Principles? 29 Political Theory 766 (William Rehg trans., 2001).
231. Id.
232. See e.g. Chantel Mouffe, Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy? 20 Socialist Rev. 57
(1990) (The article can be found in Socialist Rev. 90-2, the second publication of that year.).
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tionship between private and civic autonomy: each side is fed by resources
it has from the other.”233
I need not delve too deeply into Habermas’ formulations of private and
civic autonomy to point out that his project, which includes this reunification of democracy and constitutionalism, is a radical departure from the
traditional modernist conceptions of both constitutionalism and democracy.234 He is talking about a form of communicative democratic theory
that beefs up the merely formal and positivist legal structures in contemporary societies far beyond anything we have thus far seen historically, and
probably far beyond what most people can even conceptualize.235 Others
have discussed and constructed similar radical projects.236 The problem is
that no such radical democratic theories have taken hold. Habermas’ logic,
in this particular interest, necessitates a historical element that can be
traced to the method of G.W.F. Hegel. His reliance on this Hegelian237
device makes his account attractive for my purposes, but has been criticized for mistaking normative constitutionalist practice with a robust notion of moral justification for a particular political worldview.238 As a result, Habermas’s view would necessitate a much more complex conceptualization of the relationship between citizen and society than is currently in
fashion.
Let me return then to the first relationship that I set out in this section,
the account that articulates the relationship between constitutionalism and
democracy in derivative terms; the account proffered by Dworkin above.
This is the version that modern constitutionalism relies on. In order for the
constitutionalist state to assume its proper place, the terms of democratic
action cannot be absolute. Democratic institutions, like rights regimes,
play an important part in the equation, but only a part. This is why the
American founders went to such lengths to curb the power of majorities.239
Representative democracy is an acknowledgement that constitutionalism is
prime and the institutions of popular sovereignty must assume a formal and
narrowly defined character.

233. Habermas, supra n. 230, at 780.
234. Id.
235. See e.g. Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the
Theory of Communicative Action (Barbara Fultner trans., MIT Press 2001).
236. See e.g. Unger, supra n. 151.
237. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest ch. 3 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon Press
1971).
238. See e.g. Alessandro Ferrara, Of Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s “Constitutional Democracy”, 29 Political Theory 782 (Dec. 2001); Bonnie Honig, Dead Rights, Live Futures: A
Reply to Habermas’s “Constitutional Democracy”, 29 Political Theory 792 (Dec. 2001).
239. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 123, 144.
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This narrow notion of sovereignty is important in the context of the
present discussion because it illustrates here again the impulse behind the
theory of modern constitutionalism. The relationship between the state and
citizen is a rational one in which the individual has a certain role to play:
private actor seeking private ends. The interface between the state and this
private actor is the representative democratic apparatus. Through this apparatus, the views of the citizens can be ascertained, but not always (perhaps very rarely) acknowledged and complied with. In this version the
subservient institutions of democracy play a legitimizing role. If the constitutional structures are rational and individuals in the state have input into
(certain) decisions, how could the state not be legitimate? This view is, at
least, deductively attractive. Like the other cornerstones of constitutionalism, however, I believe this account of democracy is too feeble and hamstrung to accomplish the goals that many founders hope to accomplish; a
healthy civil society in a multicultural and pluralist world.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Modern constitutionalism has played an important part in the development of our understanding of the political and legal environment. The
concepts associated with modern constitutionalism, divided and limited
government, individual rights regimes (particularly property ownership
regimes), and representative democracy, moved political and legal structures from more rudimentary forms to those we recognize as distinctly
modern. The nation-state would not be possible without these conceptions.
The modern impulse has driven political and legal theorists to delineate the
structures of state in distinctly rationalist terms, and set these structures
against what was seen to be retrograde forms of political organization.
William Connolly describes this well when he says:
[M]odernity is the epoch in which the destruction of the world followed the collective attempt to master it. . . . Even if modernity is
not unique (it is too early to tell), it is at least distinctive. In its optimistic moments it defines itself by contrast to earlier periods
which are darker, more superstitious, less free, less rational, less
productive, less civilized, less comfortable, less democratic, less
tolerant, less respectful of the individual, less scientific and less
developed technically than it is at its best.240

240. William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity 1 (Cornell U. Press 1993).

File: ButleRitchie-Macroed

2004

Created on: 12/2/2004 9:54:00 AM

Last Printed: 12/10/2004 10:08:00 AM

THE CONFINES OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

31

The impulse behind modern constitutionalism is to break with the past,
redefine governmental structures along more rational and more scientific
lines. In short, modern constitutionalism is a positivist enterprise. This
positive move, with its rationalist motivations, constricted the bounds of
political and legal discourse. It totalized the notion of the state and its
structure. Modern constitutionalism is anti-pluralist and rests on a foundationalist core. For Hobbes, Locke, Madison and Jefferson, the move to
memorialize the structures of government in a constitutional text was a
move to universalize those structures in a normative way. The only
“good” notion of constitution is one that conforms to the narrow conception discussed above.
The presumption that such a project is possible is astonishing. The fact
that this presumption has been so widely accepted is all the more so. The
problematic thing about this “success” is that it hinders and makes static
the dynamism contained in political communities. It freezes structures in
place. It is explicitly designed to do so. Roberto Unger puts it best when
he says:
The founding liberal myth of a constitutional mechanism and a
system of rights that tower above the hierarchical and communal
divisions of society has since become true in an unacknowledged
and embarrassing sense. Liberal-democratic politics and the society in which it is practiced have indeed become separate: a social
order that consists largely of groups entrenched in fixed niches
within the division of labor and occupying stable places in the established scheme of social hierarchy coexists with a political practice that plays up to shifting coalitions of interest formed by groups
with crisscrossing and unstable membership.241
The mechanisms of modern constitutionalism fragment and stifle social
discourse. They undermine political progress instead of promoting them.
The machine may “go of itself,” but can never exceed its own limitations.
Modern constitutionalism confines our social and political possibilities.
This is particularly troubling today. The world is becoming increasingly complex. Societies are not homogeneous. They are multicultural
and pluralistic.242 Interests that were not recognized (or more properly
were subsumed and negated) in the development of modern constitutional-

241. Unger, supra n. 151, at 454-55.
242. Stanley N. Katz, The Jefferson Lecture, Constitutionalism and Civil Society, 24 (U. of Cal. at
Berkeley, Apr. 25, 2000) (copy of transcript available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/snkatz/papers/
JeffersonLecture.pdf) (accessed Dec. 5, 2004).
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ist institutions are becoming manifest.243 The demands of oppressed minorities and groups without a voice in traditional political discourses are
suing for recognition and accommodation.244 Many presume that the terms
of modern constitutionalism can provide an outlet for such calls. I am
convinced, however, that the confines of modern constitutionalism make
that possibility unlikely at best.245
There is a track record on this. Constitutionalist governments are
prone to fail. Constitutions based on western liberalism are no exception.246 There are plenty of examples of modern constitutionalist concepts
imploding in practice, and how the rationalism and positivity of liberal
conceptions of law and society can affect terrible results. Because of this
dismal track-record, there has been a call, in contemporary discussions of
constitutionalism, for an expansion of the horizons concerning the way
polities can be formed and structured. People like James Tully247 and
Stanley Katz248 have called for more pluralistic conceptions of constitutionalism. These calls have not yet come to dominate the debate (as I hope
they may well do some day), and it is not exactly clear what alternative
notions of constitutionalism might look like. Nonetheless, it is clear that
we need to escape the confines of modern constitutionalism so that a narrow, formalist conception of state organization that fosters the spread of
McDonald’s franchises and Nike shoes more than sound social organization can be escaped by cultures and societies that value principles other
than the cult of consumerism.

243. See e.g. Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Douglas
Greenberg, Stanley Katz & Melanie B. Oliviero eds., Oxford U. Press 1993); James Tully, Strange
Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge U. Press 1995); Ulric M. Killion,
China and Neo-liberal Constitutionalism, Global Jurist Frontiers 3, no. 2 (2003) (available at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss2/art3/); Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as
Interplay Between Identity and Diversity: An Introduction, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 497 (1993); Robert
Braun, Identity in Transition: Central/European/Self after Modernity (unpublished article on file with
the Pierce Law Review).
244. Yack, supra n. 6, at 107.
245. See Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, supra n. 243
(introduction).
246. Lane, supra n. 1, at 197-98.
247. See Tully, supra n. 243.
248. See Katz, supra n. 242.

